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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article analyse la décision de faire de la R&D, soit à l'interne, soit à
l'externe. Deux formes organisationnelles sont définies. Dans la structure intégrée,
la firme utilisant ou vendant l'innovation finance et effectue la R&D. Dans la
structure indépendante, cette même firme achète l'innovation d'une firme de R&D
indépendante. On compare les deux types d'organisations sous l'hypothèse que
l'unité de R&D possède une information privilégiée sur le coût de développement
de l'innovation. Lorsque les coûts de développement sont corrélés négativement
avec les bénéfices de l'innovation, la structure intégrée domine. La structure
indépendante domine dans le cas contraire.
This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out
by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing
the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated
structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and finances
research leading to the innovation. In an independent structure, the firm that
markets the innovation buys it from an independent research unit which is
financed externally. We compare the two structures under the assumption that the
research unit has some private information about the real cost of developing the
new product. When development costs are negatively correlated with revenues
from the innovation, the integrated structure dominates. The independent
structure dominates in the opposite case.
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1 Introduction
Research and development activities take place in various organizational forms depending
on who nances, creates, develops, produces and sells the innovation. A widely observed
organizational form is in-house R&D. The innovation is nanced and produced within the
same rm who uses the new product or the new technology. Researchers-inventors are subject
to an employment contract.
Innovations can also be produced externally. Research and development activities are
conducted by an independent rm whose objective is to create a new product or a new
technology and then to develop it in a venture with the user rm. The innovation process
is managed and owned by the independent research unit rm and nanced by a nancial
partner, for example, a venture capitalist.
Both organizational structures are observed in many industries. In the pharmaceutical
industry, a rm like Merck nances mainly in-house R&D, while some of its major rivals
are outsourcing most of their research activities to biotechnology rms. Only 5% or so
of Merck's research spending ends up outside the rm's laboratories. For other top drug
companies, however, the proportion of research done externally can reach 80%. Recently,
some American pharmaceutical companies moved from in-house R&D to independent R&D
by increasing their research joint-venture agreements. These research joint ventures are
contractual agreements for developing, producing and selling a new medicine discovered
by a biotech rm (Lerner and Merges, 1998). In 1994, 117 ventures between drug and
biotechnology rms were signed, 70% more than the previous year.
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This empirical evidence raises an important question. Why are dierent organizational
forms observed? If one organization is more eÆcient than the other one, the ineÆcient
organizational structure should not be observed, or should disappear in the long run. The
objective of this paper is to provide arguments based on contractual imperfections that
explain the choice of an organizational structure for R&D activities.
1
\The Economist", May 13th 1995, pp. 66{67, and May 24th 1997, pp. 59{60.
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The economic environment for research and development activities and the eventual mar-
keting of the innovation is characterized by two main features: uncertainty and informational
asymmetries. When working on an innovation, a rm does not know for sure the result of
its R&D activities. Research methodologies employed to discover an innovation (what Dosi
(1988) calls \technology trajectories") can be specied ex ante but their outcome can hardly
be perfectly predicted. For example, in the case of the pharmaceutical industry, one favorite
research methodology employed is \combinatorial chemistry" which consists in using arbi-
trary chemical reactions to generate millions of randomly shaped molecules. One of the new
discovered molecules might just lead to the next drug. The discovery of a new drug depends
on the success of this process, and its properties such as safety, eÆciency, cost eectiveness
of treatment are never known ex ante. Research and development activities are random and,
therefore, constitute a risky investment.
Second, the marketing of an innovation is characterized by asymmetric information. The
value of an innovation depends on characteristics such as the new technology's eÆciency or
the new product's quality. While this information is diÆcult to obtain before the innovation
is developed, produced and sold, the research unit may have more information about the
cost of bringing the innovation to the market. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry,
coordination between researchers and factory designers is not easy. Clearly, bringing a new
medicine to the market is not trivial and needs cooperation between agents which may
not have the same information. According to a recent report, mistakes in the development
process can increase costs by 40%.
2
Asymmetric information explains some of the complexity
of research joint-venture agreements.
Uncertainty and asymmetric information are two basic ingredients of our model. We
dene two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the innovation is produced
in-house by the rm who then uses or markets it. This rm sets up its own research unit
by nancing a laboratory and hiring scientists. The contract signed between the rm and
the members of the research unit is an employment contract. The manager of the rm has
2
\The Economist", November 9th, 1996, p. 77.
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hierarchical authority over the research unit. Main decisions about investment, nancing,
development, production, and marketing of the innovation are made by the manager after
possibly consulting with the research unit.
In an independent structure, the research unit is a separate rm. Financing is provided
by a bank or a venture capitalist. After innovating, the rm sells the innovation to another
rm by signing a joint-venture agreement or a technological alliance. The research unit
installs the new process in a factory, or tests the new product for specic purposes. The user
rm then operates the new technology, or produces and markets the new product.
The essential dierence we introduce for these two structures is about the transferability
of decision rights. In an integrated structure, decision rights cannot be credibly transfered
among members of the organization. The law of contracts does not apply to such transfers.
Hierarchical authority has priority over any agreement to transfer decision rights, that is,
any decision to delegate decision making can be reversed by the hierarchical authority. In
an independent structure, decision rights can be transfered since property rights can. We
show that this essential dierence is suÆcient to make the choice of organizational design
nontrivial.
This intuition formally translates into the following assumptions. The contract governing
the relationship in an integrated structure is subject to renegotiation since decision rights
cannot be credibly transferred. Such renegotiation reduces the eÆciency of the organization.
In an independent structure, the innovation is nanced externally. Financial agency costs
lead to ineÆciencies which reduce the ability of the nancial contract to diversify innovation
risk. The two structures are aicted by two dierent sources of ineÆciencies: noncom-
mitment in the integrated structure and nancial market imperfections in the independent
structure. The relative eÆciency of the two structures depends on the characteristics of the
innovation. When the cost of developing the innovation is negatively correlated with its mar-
ket value, the integrated structure dominates the independent structure. The independent
structure dominates in the opposite case. The basic intuition for this result goes as follows.
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In the rst case, the negative correlation between the development cost and market value
implies that overall prots are very risky. Financial imperfections are then very costly and
the integrated structure is more eÆcient.
We now briey sketch how our paper relates to the literature. In the management litera-
ture, it is often argued that in-house R&D may reduce problems associated with asymmetric
information, and that better coordination between innovators, production and marketing
departments is achieved within an organization. With its own research unit, a rm has the
scientic expertise to evaluate new technologies and new products (Armour and Teece, 1979;
Lampel, Miller, and Floricel, 1996). This approach assumes that the objective of all units
within the rm is to maximize the global prot of the organization. This may not be true
if the units behave noncooperatively or opportunistically. A \selsh" research unit may not
behave according to the organization's own interest. For example, a research unit may prefer
not to reveal the true value (possibly low) of its discovery if its reward from the innovation
does not provide it with such incentives. Hence, integrating the research unit within the
user rm does not necessary solve the asymmetric-information problem. Incentive schemes
rather than organizational form per se can mitigate the asymmetric-information problem.
It may be the case, however, that dierent incentive schemes are possible depending on the
organizational structure. This is precisely the focus of our paper.
Aghion and Tirole (1994) provide a rst attempt at opening the \black box of innovation"
in a incomplete-contracting framework. They suppose that R&D is a random activity per-
formed by two risk-neutral agents, a research unit RU and the innovation user C. Its success
depends on an initial investment provided by C and an noncontractible eort supplied by
RU. In an integrated structure, property rights on the innovation are allocated to C. This im-
plies that RU receives no reward for innovation. RU then supplies no eort while C supplies
the optimal level of investment . In a independent structure, RU owns the innovation and
bargains with C over the licensing fee once the innovation has been made. Assuming that
agents have the same bargaining power, the value of innovation is equally split ex post. In
this case, since each agent does not get the full return of its eort or investment, it supplies
4
a second-best level eort or investment. The optimal structure depends on the marginal
eÆciency of RU's eort compared with the marginal eÆciency of C's investment.
Even though our model shares some features of Aghion and Tirole's (1994) model, the
basic intuition is dierent. They mainly stress that the innovation process is noncontractible
and hence property rights are allocated as a means of alleviating contract incompleteness
(as in Grossman and Hart, 1986). In a complete-contract environment, we stress that the
innovation process is risky (and that this matters because RU is risk averse) and that there
are informational problems reducing the eÆciency of contractual agreements in sharing risk.
Depending on the allocation of property rights, dierent contractual imperfections arise. If
they are allocated to C, RU has to transfer its knowledge of the information to C and rene-
gotiation aects the eÆciency of the organization. If they are allocated to RU, renegotiation
can be avoided, but nancing is subject to agency costs. In this sense, the two models are
complementary since they both stress important aspects of innovation activities.
Recent papers point out that bureaucratic organizations perform poorly in R&D. Dear-
den, Ickes and Samuelson (1990) show that a centralized structure has low incentives to
adopt new technologies because of the ratchet eect. Quian and Xu (1998) argue that a soft
budget constraint and an ex ante bureaucratic evaluation process can explain the centralized
organizations' failure in innovating. A bureaucracy makes mistakes by rejecting promising
projects and delaying innovations. In-house R&D produces high-cost innovations that are
well-specied ex ante. It is, however, unable to subsidize less costly projects which may be
riskier. Our model of the integrated structure has some of that avor as noncommitment is
a consequence of the nontransferability of decision rights.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents
the main assumptions underlying both organizational structures. We analyze the integrated
structure in Section 4 and the independent one in Section 5. We compare the two structures'
performance in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
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2 The model
A research unit RU produces an innovation. When investing I in research, RU obtains a
high-quality innovation h with probability p(I) and a low-quality innovation l (l < h) with
probability 1   p(I). We suppose p increasing and concave, with p(0) = 0, p
0
(0) = 1,
lim
I!1
p(I)  1.
The innovation is marketed by rm C. Before selling the innovation, RU and C must
operationalize its production. This is the development phase. RU incurs a development cost
D(q; ) depending on the scale of project q and on the innovation quality . We assume
that D is increasing and convex in q, and that total and marginal development costs are
decreasing in :
D
q
(q; ) > 0; D
qq
(q; ) > 0; D(q; h) < D(q; l); D
q
(q; h) < D
q
(q; l) 8 q > 0:
Following the development phase, C can start producing and marketing the product. C earns
a net revenue P (q; ). The function P is increasing and concave in q at least on [0; q] with
q large. We assume
P
q
(q; ) > 0; P
qq
(q; ) < 0 8 0 < q < q:
This function can encompass both process and product innovations. For a process innovation,
the innovation quality aects the net revenue function mainly through lower production
costs. For a product innovation, the innovation quality aects the net revenue function
mainly through higher revenues.
For an innovation quality  2 fl; hg, the R&D process generates a global prot gross of
initial investment of
(q; ) = P (q; ) D(q; ):
A high-quality innovation is assumed globally more protable than a low-quality one, that
is, (q; h) > (q; l).
6
Innovations are distinguished by the relationship between revenues and development
costs.
 Major innovation
A type h innovation generates higher total and marginal revenues than a type l one.
Formally,
P (q; h) > P (q; l); P
q
(q; h) > P
q
(q; l) 8 0 < q < q:
 Minor innovation
A type h innovation generates lower total and marginal revenues than a type l one.
Formally,
P (q; h) < P (q; l); P
q
(q; h) < P
q
(q; l) 8 0 < q < q:
For a major innovation, moving from a low-quality innovation to a high-quality innovation
reduces development costs and increases revenues, that is, development costs and revenues
are negatively correlated. The opposite holds for a minor innovation. It turns out that the
sign of this correlation plays a signicant role in our analysis.
3
We denote by q


the project size which maximizes global prot (q; ). It is assumed that
q

h
 q

l
, that is, a high-quality innovation is marginally more protable than a low-quality
one, regardless of whether the innovation is major or minor. We denote by I

the investment
level which maximizes the expected global prot
p(I)(q

h
; h) + (1  p(I))(q

l
; l)  I:
RU's utility V depends on its income w net of development costs:
V (w; q; ) = v(w  D(q; )):
3
In Section 6, we give examples of both major and minor innovations.
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We suppose that RU is risk averse: v is increasing and concave (v
0
> 0, v
00
< 0). Firm C is
risk neutral. Its utility U is linear in revenues net of any transfer payment w:
U(w; q; ) = P (q; )  w:
Its reservation utility is normalized to zero.
We now study the organization of R&D activities under the assumption that the inno-
vation quality is private information of RU.
3 The organization of R&D activities
We dene two types of organizations. In an integrated structure, R&D activities are
conducted internally within rm C. RU can be seen as a division or a department of C. Firm
C invests and nances the investment in research I, pays its research unit RU a wage w and
develops a project of scale q.
In an independent structure, RU is an autonomous rm, and it must nance its re-
search activities externally. A competitive nancier F nances the investment I and gets
reimbursed R when the innovation is sold. After the research period and before the develop-
ment period, RU and C negotiate a joint-venture agreement which species the project size
q and RU's wage or royalties w. C then produces and markets the innovation.
The two structures dier in two important aspects. First, the transferability of decision
rights is governed by dierent rules in each structure. In an integrated organization, the
decision right over the project belongs to C. This right cannot be credibly transferred from
C to RU as the rule of law does not govern over such intrarm transaction. For example,
even if this right was transfered to RU, C could always repossess it because it has hierarchical
authority over RU. In a private-information environment, this implies that RU is communi-
cating its information about the innovation quality to C who then uses it to decide on the
project size. In an independent organization, the property right over the project initially
8
belongs to C. Since C and RU are independent rms, this right can be \sold" from C to
RU through a joint venture, and the judicial system can enforce such transaction. With the
property right comes the decision right. Formally, this amounts to RU choosing the project
size, using its own private information about the innovation quality.
4
The way information
is communicated and used has implications for the eÆciency of each structure.
Second, the nancing of investment is subject to dierent agency costs. In an integrated
structure, nancing the investment is done internally. In an independent structure, RU must
nance externally. We assume here, as in most of the literature in corporate nance, that
external nancing is subject to larger agency costs than internal nancing.
5
To capture this
idea, we assume that project size and payos are observable to C and RU, but nonobservable
to F. The nancial contract with F has to take this unobservability into account when
specifying nancial repayments.
There are three objectives to pursue when players interact. First, incentives must be
provided to RU for an appropriate investment I in R&D. Second, once the innovation has
been concretized, incentives must be provided to undertake an appropriate project size q.
Finally, insurance must be given to RU against the risk inherent to the innovation process.
The performance of the two structures in their relative ability to pursue these objectives
is compared under the assumptions that decision rights cannot be credibly transferred in an
integrated structure and that external nancing is costlier than internal nancing. Under
these assumptions, an interesting trade-o in the choice of the organization of R&D emerges.
Before solving for the optimal allocation in each structure, we characterize the symmetric-
information optimal solution. It can be implemented with either structure.
 I = I

, q

= q


for  = l; h.
 In the integrated structure, v(w
i
h
 D(q

h
; h)) = v(w
i
l
 D(q

l
; l)).
4
Klibano and Poitevin (1999) explore further the issue of rights and commitment in a model of exter-
nality.
5
See, for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Myers, 1984.
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 In the independent (autonomous) structure,
v(w
a
h
 R
a
h
 D(q

h
; h)) = v(w
a
l
  R
a
l
 D(q

l
; l)).
 v(w
i

 D(q


; )) = v(w
a

  R
a

 D(q


; )) for all  2 fl; hg.
First, allocative eÆciency is attained for investment and project size for both qualities of
innovation. For both structures, RU is fully insured against the risk of innovation. Insurance
is provided by C in the integrated structure, and by F, in the independent structure. Finally,
RU has the same payo in both structures.
6
We now assess the performance of each structure under the assumption that RU is pri-
vately informed about the quality of the innovation. Throughout, we assume that RU has
the bargaining power when negotiating contracts with C and F. This assumption makes the
comparison of the two structures more tractable.
4 The integrated structure
In the integrated structure, contractual negotiations and implementation are formalized by
the following game.
1. RU proposes a research and development contract c
RD
= fI; fw
^
; q
^
g
h
^=l
g to C who
can accept it or reject it.
2. If it is accepted, RU invests I. If not, the game ends and both players obtain their
reservation utility.
3. RU observes the innovation quality , and selects a message ^ 2 fl; hg.
(a) RU then proposes a new contract c
r
= (w; q) to C.
7
6
Under symmetric information, both structures yield the same equilibrium allocation from the point of
view of RU.
7
Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) explain why this contract cannot contain more than one element. It would
not be necessary if there were an innite number of rounds of renegotiation.
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(b) If it is rejected, the contract c
RD
remains the outstanding contract. If c
r
is ac-
cepted, it becomes the outstanding contract.
4. The innovation is developed, produced, and sold while transfers are paid as prescribed
by the outstanding contract.
The fact that property rights cannot credibly be transferred from C to RU implies that
RU must communicate its private information to C who then decides on the project size.
Formally, this form of communication raises the possibility for C and RU to renegotiate the
initial contract after RU has communicated its private information to C.
8
The possibility for
renegotiation is formally taken into account in stage 3(a).
We characterize the equilibrium allocations that are not renegotiated along the equi-
librium path, namely, renegotiation-proof allocations. Such allocations can be supported
by equilibrium strategies that do not involve any renegotiation along the equilibrium path.
A renegotiation-proof allocation fw
^
; q
^
g
h
^=l
must satisfy the following inequalities for all
^ = l; h.
9
V (w
h
; q
h
; h)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; h) s=t U(w; q; h)  U(w
^
; q
^
; h)
U(w; q; l)  U(w
^
; q
^
; l)g (RP
^
h
)
V (w
l
; q
l
; l)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; l) s=t U(w; q; h)  U(w
^
; q
^
); h)
U(w; q; l)  U(w
^
; q
^
; l)g (RP
^
l
)
These constraints replace the usual incentive-compatibility constraints, and therefore repre-
sent generalized incentive-compatibility constraints that incorporate the possibility of rene-
gotiation. Each constraint RP
^

implies that, given a status-quo position (w
^
; q
^
) attained
following a report ^ by RU, C only accepts those renegotiation oers that increase its utility
8
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole (1992), and Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) all argue
that this is in fact the only instance where renegotiation can have an eect. Renegotiating after the arrival
of private information but before it has been communicated has no eect on the initial contract.
9
This is shown formally in Beaudry and Poitevin (1993, 1995) when renegotiation can have an innite or
a nite number of rounds respectively.
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regardless of its beliefs about the quality of the innovation. Suppose that constraint RP
^

is
satised at a status-quo position (w
^
; q
^
). For any oer that RU prefers to (w
^
; q
^
), there
exists a belief for C such that it is worse o under the new oer than under the status-quo
position. When assigned with this belief, C simply rejects the oer of RU. If an alloca-
tion satises these constraints, it is not possible for RU to increase its utility by selecting a
message ^ and then making a renegotiation oer. It is in this sense that the renegotiation-
proof constraints represent generalized incentive-compatibility constraints. Since these con-
straints allow for renegotiation, they are more stringent than usual incentive-compatibility
constraints.
We characterize the equilibrium renegotiation-proof allocation fI
i
; fw
i

; q
i

g
h
=l
g that yields
RU the highest expected utility.
10
It solves the following maximization problem.
max
f
I;fw

;q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w
h
; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w
l
; q
l
; l)
subject to : p(I)U(w
h
; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))U(w
l
; q
l
; l)  I = 0 (IR
C
)
V (w
h
; q
h
; h)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; h) s=t U(w; q; h)  U(w
^
; q
^
; h)
U(w; q; l)  U(w
^
; q
^
; l)g 8 ^ = l; h (RP
^
h
)
V (w
l
; q
l
; l)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; l) s=t U(w; q; h)  U(w
^
; q
^
; h)
U(w; q; l)  U(w
^
; q
^
; l)g 8 ^ = l; h (RP
^
l
)
In this problem, RU's expected utility is maximized subject to C's participation constraint
(IR
C
) and the set of incentive renegotiation-proof constraints.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium allocation fI
i
; fw
i

; q
i

g
h
=l
g satises the following relation-
ships.
 For major innovations:
q
i
h
= q

h
, q
i
l
= q

l
;
w
i
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
i
l
 D(q

l
; l).
10
There may be multiple equilibria depending on the assignment of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We focus
here on the equilibrium allocation that RU prefers. This facilitates the comparison with the independent
structure.
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 For minor innovations:
q
i
h
= q

h
, q
i
l
= q

hl
< q

l
where q

hl
= argmax
q
P (q; h) D(q; l);
w
i
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
i
l
 D(q

hl
; l).
 p
0
(I
i
)f(V (w
i
h
; q
i
h
; h) V (w
i
l
; q
i
l
; l)) =E

[v
0
(w
i

 D(q
i

; ))jI
i
]+U(w
i
h
; q
i
h
; h) U(w
i
l
; q
i
l
; l)g=
1.
With symmetric information, RU's utility is equalized in both states. This implies that
w
l
> w
h
since development costs are higher in state l. Under asymmetric information, RU
then has incentives to report type l when its true type is h to obtain a higher wage. The
renegotiation-proof constraint RP
l
h
is therefore binding, that is, when the innovation quality
is high and RU announces a low-quality innovation and then renegotiates. To prevent type
h from mimicking type l, the contract increases the wage gap and imposes more risk on
RU. When the innovation is major, no distortion in q
l
can be used ex ante to induce truth-
telling because any such distortion would be renegotiated away in stage 3(a). For a minor
innovation, some underproduction for the low-quality innovation is renegotiation-proof, and
is therefore used to mitigate the risk allocated to RU. Finally, the normalized sum of marginal
benets to investment determines the optimal investment policy. Without specic functional
forms, the investment I
i
cannot be directly compared to the rst-best level I

. With risk
aversion, the investment plays the dual role of determining the size of the pie and reducing
the risk of the venture.
Note that by the end of the game rm C can infer the type of RU from the observation of
its own prots. As in most of the literature, we implicitly assume that either ex post prots
are not veriable to third party or that it is not possible to punish RU if it had misrepresented
its type. This eectively precludes C from using a forcing contract that would be based on
the realization of its own prots. We now move to the analysis of the independent structure.
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5 The independent structure
In an independent structure, RU seeks external nancing before starting the research phase.
Agents play the following game.
1. RU proposes a nancial contract c
F
= fI; fR
^
g
h
^=l
g to F who can accept or reject it.
2. If it is accepted, RU invests I. If not, the game ends and both players obtain their
reservation utility.
3. RU observes the innovation quality . It then proposes a development contract c
D
=
fw(q)g to C who can accept or reject it. If it is rejected, the nancial contract is void,
the game ends and all players obtain their reservation utility.
4. If it is accepted, the contract is carried out: RU implements a project size q, and a
report ^ 2 fl; hg is sent to F; the innovation is developed, produced and sold while
transfers are paid as prescribed by the contracts c
F
and c
D
.
The dierence between this game and the one played in the integrated structure underlines
the assumptions we pose for each structure. Property rights can credibly be transferred in
the independent structure. The development contract allows for these rights to be transfered
from C to RU through the use of a nonlinear transfer schedule. RU eectively chooses the
project size q and sells it to C for royalties w(q). Financing is done externally, which implies
that RU and F must sign a formal contract. The project size that RU chooses is unobservable
to F, and hence the nancial payment R from RU to F must depend on a report that RU
sends to F.
In Lemma 1, we characterize the optimal nancial contract.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, the equilibrium nancial contract fI
a
; fR
a
^
g
h
^=l
g is
such that R
a
l
= R
a
h
= I
a
.
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Because F cannot observe output nor revenue, the optimal nancial contract is a debt con-
tract where the nancial repayment is independent of the quality of the innovation.
11
Fur-
thermore, this payment is equal to the lent amount, I
a
, so that F breaks even. Given this re-
sult, the separating-equilibrium allocation of the independent structure,
n
I
a
; fw
a
(q

); q
a

g
h
=l
o
,
that maximizes the expected utility of RU is the solution to the following maximization prob-
lem.
12
max
f
I;fw(q

);q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; h)) + (1  p(I))V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; l)
subject to : U(w(q
h
); q
h
; h)  0 (IR
C
h
)
U(w(q
l
); q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
l
)
V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; h)  V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; h) (IC
h
)
V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; l)  V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; l) (IC
l
)
RU's expected utility is maximized subject to C's participation constraints (IR
C

) and RU's
incentive-compatibility constraints (IC

).
Proposition 2 The equilibrium allocation satises the following relationships.
 P (q
a

; )  w
a
(q
a

) = 0 8  2 fl; hg.
 For major innovations:
q
a
l
= q

l
, q
a
h
=
8
>
<
>
:
q

h
if (q

l
; l)  P (q

h
; h) D(q

h
; l)
q
S
h
otherwise
with q
S
h
> q

h
such that (q

l
; l) = P (q
S
h
; h) D(q
S
h
; l);
w
a
h
 D(q
a
h
; h) > w
a
l
 D(q

l
; l).
 For minor innovations:
q
a
h
= q

h
, q
a
l
=
8
>
<
>
:
q

l
if (q

h
; h)  P (q

l
; l) D(q

l
; h)
q
S
l
otherwise
11
We implicitly assume that the debt contract is riskless. Incorporating the possibility of default would
not alter our main conclusions provided that F could audit RU at a cost (Townsend, 1979).
12
This is the only equilibrium allocation that survives the application of the Intuitive criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987).
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with q
S
l
< q

l
such that (q

h
; h) = P (q
S
l
; l) D(q
S
l
; h);
w
a
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
a
l
 D(q
a
l
; l).
 p
0
(I
a
) f(V (w
a
h
; q
a
h
; h)  V (w
a
l
; q
a
l
; l)) =E

[v
0
(w
a

 D(q
a

; ))jI
a
]g = 1.
The main consequence of imperfect external nancing is that F cannot provide any insurance
to RU since nancial repayments are the same in each state of nature. C cannot provide
insurance either since its contract is negotiated once the innovation has been realized. RU
supports all research risk. Investment is therefore determined by the incremental value for
RU of a high-quality innovation compared to a low-quality one. The development contract
is negotiated in a signaling environment where prior beliefs p(I) do not aect the separating
allocation. Since the nancial contract inuences only beliefs (through the choice of invest-
ment), the specics of the development contract do not depend on the nancial contract.
In the development contract, C's individual-rationality constraints are binding. For a major
innovation, C's revenues are higher for a high-quality innovation. RU can therefore extract
more royalties from C. RU then wants to overstate the quality of the innovation, and the
binding incentive constraint is that for a low-quality innovation. If it is binding, RU over-
produces in state h to satisfy the incentive constraint of type l. The exact opposite holds for
a minor innovation. RU underproduces in state l to satisfy the incentive constraint of type
h.
The nonlinear transfer schedule is such that RU's incentives to behave truthfully are
preserved. For all nonequilibrium output levels, the transfer is set at a large negative number.
The equilibrium wage is such that RU earns more when the innovation is type h than when
it is type l. Finally, the marginal benet to investment accruing to RU normalized by its
expected marginal utility determines the optimal investment policy. Again, without specic
functional forms, the investment I
i
cannot be directly compared to the rst-best level I

.
With risk aversion, the investment plays the dual role of determining the size of the pie and
reducing the risk of the venture.
In the next section, we compare the performance of the two structures.
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6 Performance of the two structures
The criterion to identify the optimal structure is RU's expected utility. Since all other players
earn zero expected prots and utility is transferable through contractual payments, this is
the appropriate selecting criterion. We rst establish a benchmark case in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that P (q; l) = P (q; h). Both organizational structures yield the same
expected payo to RU.
This lemma establishes that when C's payo does not depend on the quality of innovation,
both structures perform equivalently from the point of view of RU. In the integrated struc-
ture, renegotiation-proof constraints impose ex post eÆciency in production and no risk
sharing. When C's payo is independent of innovation quality, the threat of renegotiation
eliminates all possibility for sharing risk since C accepts all renegotiation oers that do not
decrease its expected payo regardless of the innovation quality. When C's payo is inde-
pendent of the innovation quality, this implies that C must earn the same payo for each
type of innovation. Hence, no risk sharing is possible.
In the independent structure, the nancial contract provides no risk sharing, while the
contract with C yields ex post eÆciency in production and no risk sharing. Ex post eÆ-
ciency is attained since C's payo does not depend on the innovation quality. Contractual
negotiations between RU and C are therefore frictionless.
Both organizational structures yield eÆcient production and provide no risk sharing to
RU. The level of investment is therefore the same under both structures. Consequently, both
structures perform equivalently when C's payo is independent of the innovation quality.
We now assume that the innovation quality aects C's payo. The comparison of the two
organizational structures depends on whether the innovation is major or minor. We analyze
these two cases in turn.
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 Major innovation
Recall that for a major innovation, a type h innovation generates higher total and mar-
ginal revenues than a type l one. Formally,
P (q; h) > P (q; l); P
q
(q; h) > P
q
(q; l) 8 0 < q < q:
We can establish the superiority of the integrated structure when the innovation is major.
Proposition 3 For major innovations, the integrated structure yields a higher expected pay-
o to RU than the independent structure.
The intuition for this result can be given in terms of the eects of contractual imperfections
on the extent of risk sharing provided to RU. Agency costs come from the fact that con-
tracts insure RU against the risk of innovation, and risk sharing conicts with asymmetric
information. When C's payo is independent of the quality of innovation, both structures
are equivalent. Now suppose that a low-quality innovation generates slightly lower marginal
and total revenues than a high-quality one. In the independent structure, this worsens risk
sharing as the dierence between the total value of a high and a low innovation increases.
It increases since the protability of the low-quality innovation decreases. Since RU gets
the residual value in each state and there is debt nancing, RU supports the full loss from
such decrease, thus bearing more risk and reducing its expected payo. In the integrated
structure, RU supports the full loss from the reduction in the protability of the low-quality
innovation. Risk-sharing is, however, unaected as all increase in risk is supported by C.
The integrated structure then dominates the independent structure since the former provides
better insurance to RU than the latter.
 Minor innovation
Recall that for a minor innovation, a type h innovation generates lower total and marginal
revenues than a type l one. Formally,
P (q; h) < P (q; l); P
q
(q; h) < P
q
(q; l) 8 0 < q < q:
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We can establish the superiority of the independent structure when the innovation is minor
(under some other condition).
Proposition 4 Suppose that (q
S
l
; l)  (q

hl
; l) where (q

h
; h) = P (q
S
l
; l)   D(q
S
l
; h) and
q

hl
= argmax
q
P (q; h)   D(q; l): For minor innovations, the independent structure yields a
higher expected payo to RU than the integrated structure.
Suppose that a low-quality innovation generates slightly higher marginal revenues than a
high-quality one. In the independent structure, this improves risk sharing as the dierence
between the total value of a high and a low innovation shrinks. This dierence shrinks
since the protability of the low-quality innovation increases. Since C gets its reservation
value in each state and nancing is achieved through debt, RU gets all benets from such
increase, thus increasing its expected payo and improving risk sharing. In the integrated
structure, the renegotiation-proof constraint becomes less stringent and therefore allows
for some distortion in q
l
to improve risk sharing. Such distortion implies that RU cannot
appropriate the whole surplus generated by the increase in revenues. The independent
structure then dominates the integrated structure.
The assumption that (q
S
l
; l)  (q

hl
; l) is satised for innovations that do not generate
extreme dierences in revenues, that is, when P (q; l) is not too dierent from P (q; h). This
is a suÆcient condition for the result to obtain. It is, however, not necessary. The precise
characterization of a necessary and suÆcient condition is not easy to obtain and we limit
our analysis to this assumption.
The dierence between the two cases stems from the eect of technology on the amount
of risk in the venture. From a situation where there is no revenue risk, increasing revenues
for low-quality innovations reduces the total risk in P (q; )   D(q; ). In the independent
structure, RU supports all risk. It therefore gains from the increase in revenue as well as
from the reduction in risk. The independent structure is then optimal. When the revenues
of low-quality innovations is decreased, the opposite holds. Total risk is increased. In the
independent structure, RU supports all this extra risk while also losing from the loss in
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revenue. The integrated structure is then optimal.
This result has a testable implication. We show that major innovations are produced
in-house, while minor ones tend to be produced in independent rms. Consider the case of
the pharmaceutical industry described in the Introduction. Development activities consist
in testing the new drug. The development process starts with toxicology analyzes and
goes through clinical trials on animals, on human volunteers and nally on patients (small
samples and then large samples). The new drug must be patented before entering the trial
process. The patent-protection lasts twenty years, while the trial process can take several
years.
13
Saving time during the development phase is therefore particularly important.
Every day saved on trial is an extra day of patent protection saved. The trial period of an
innovation is long and costly, and it lowers its patent protection, hence the gross prot of the
marketing rm. There is a negative correlation between development costs and revenues.
This corresponds to the case of a major innovation. Our model then predicts that R&D
activities are more eÆciently organized in-house. Although there is some research done
externally in the pharmaceutical industry, casual evidence seems to suggest that a lot of
it is undertaken in large pharmaceutical rms. Asymmetric information and contractual
imperfections can explain this organizational form. It reinforces the eect of other factors
such as economies of scale in research, large nancing requirements, etc.
For a technological innovation, it is often the case that when the cost to develop and
install a new technology is high, savings on production costs are also high. Consider the
information-technology industry. Suppose that a rm can reduce its costs by using a more
eÆcient communication network. A new network is costly to install but can treat a lot of
information very quickly. Only improving the existing network is relatively cheap to install,
but it is usually less eÆcient. The software industry is another example. When a new version
of an existing software or system is adopted by a rm, the costs incurred by the research unit
(mostly the training of the user rm's employers) are low and savings are also low. When
13
The Economist, February 21st, 1998, Survey of the Pharmaceutical Industry, pp. 3-5; Tapon and Cadsby
(1996).
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the new software or system is very dierent, and therefore needs more training, savings on
production costs can be very high. In these two examples, there is a positive correlation
between development and installation costs and revenues. This corresponds to the case of
a minor innovation. Our model then predicts that such innovations tend to be produced
by independent rms. Again, there is casual evidence for this. Many rms outsource the
management of information technology. Consequently, a lot of rm-specic software is being
developed by independent sub-contractors.
Our explanation of these facts rests on asymmetric information and contractual imperfec-
tions. Integrated rms tend to be ineÆcient because it is easy to deviate from an initial plan,
which we model here as renegotiation. Independent rms incur agency costs when seeking
external nancing, which we model here as nonobservability of prots by the nancier. We
believe that a dierent formulation for these agency costs would still yield a tradeo between
the two structures that is qualitatively similar to the one characterized here. The advantage
of our modeling assumptions is that it yields results which seem to broadly t some stylized
facts.
Our model makes sharp predictions about the organization of R&D. In reality, rms may
pursue some R&D activities in-house as well as buy some innovations from independent rms.
This can easily be reconciled with our results. Minor innovations would mostly be acquired
on the market while major innovations would tend to be produced in-house. Alternatively,
suppose that rms do not know in advance whether the innovation will be major or minor.
Firms may diversify this risk by supporting both in-house and external R&D activities. The
intensity of each type of organization would then depend on the likelihood of each type of
innovation quality.
We can give a nal interpretation to our results. Suppose that integrated rms tend to
be larger rms, while independent rms are mostly small R&D rms. Our model predicts
that it is eÆcient for large rms to develop drastic innovation (those for which the variance
is high), while small rms strive for the less drastic ones.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal structure of R&D activities in a model with a random research
process, asymmetric information about its outcome and heterogeneity in players' attitude
toward risk. When contracts can be renegotiated and prots are nonobservable to external
nanciers, a tradeo emerges for the optimal organization of research activities. In a previous
version of this paper, we show that these are necessary assumptions for this tradeo to
emerge. When agents can commit and prots are observable to external nanciers (but RU
still has some private information), both structures are equivalent. External nanciers can
provide the same risk sharing as C does in the integrated structure. Asymmetric information
is not suÆcient per se to explain the organization of research activities. More contractual
imperfections are needed for a tradeo between the two structures to emerge.
An interesting extension would be to study the strategic role of organizational structure
in imperfect output markets. Our model can provide a crude and partial analysis. For
major innovations, expected output is higher under the independent structure than under
the integrated structure. With imperfect output markets and Cournot competition, an
independent organization of research activities yields a competitive advantage by committing
to a larger output. This advantage would have to be weighted against the optimality of the
integrated structure when there is no strategic consideration.
For minor innovations, expected output is higher under the independent structure under
the assumption of Proposition 4, so that the presence of imperfect output markets would
reinforce the case for the optimality of the independent structure. When (q
S
l
; l) < (q

hl
; l),
however, expected output is larger under the integrated structure, and again a tradeo would
emerge. A full analysis of these considerations is certainly worthwhile.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We characterize the solution to a relaxed maximization problem in which only constraints
(IR
C
) and (RP
l
h
) are included. We then show that, at this solution the omitted constraints
are satised. The proof treats alternatively the cases of major and minor innovations.
Major innovation
Since the only incentive constraint is (RP
l
h
), it follows that q
i
h
= q

h
. The constraint (RP
l
h
)
is strictly binding which implies that the allocation fw
i
l
; q
i
l
g is on the curve U(w; q; l) that is
tangent to V (w
i
h
; q

h
; h), that is, by mimicking type l, the best renegotiation oer that type
h can make and that C is sure to accept is along this curve U(w; q; l). Furthermore, doing
so would give type h exactly its equilibrium payo. The equilibrium contract of type l is
therefore on the curve U(w; q; l) that is tangent to V (w
i
h
; q

h
; h). This xes the payo that
C gets from its contract with type l. Given this, type l's allocation must be its preferred
contract on this curve. It is easy to show that this implies that q
i
l
= q

l
. Project size has now
been determined for each type. Wages are adjusted such that (IR
C
) and (RP
l
h
) are strictly
binding. Since project sizes are eÆcient, the constraints (RP


) for  = l; h are satised.
And, it is easy to show that, if (RP
l
h
) is strictly binding, then (RP
h
l
) is satised. Finally,
since both utility curves (for the two types) are tangent to the same U(w; q; l) curve and
since type h has lower development costs, we have w
i
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
i
l
 D(q

l
; l).
Minor innovation
Since the only incentive constraint is (RP
l
h
), it follows that q
i
h
= q

h
. The constraint
(RP
l
h
) is strictly binding which implies that the allocation fw
i
l
; q
i
l
g is on the curve U(w; q; h)
that is tangent to V (w
i
h
; q

h
; h), that is, by mimicking type l, the best renegotiation oer that
type h can make and that C is sure to accept is along this curve U(w; q; h).
14
Furthermore,
doing so would give type h exactly its equilibrium payo. The equilibrium contract of type
l is therefore on the curve U(w; q; h) that is tangent to V (w
i
h
; q

h
; h). Given this, type l's
allocation must be its preferred contract on this curve from the point of view of type l. It
is easy to show that this implies that q
i
l
= q

hl
< q

l
since a type h innovation generates
less revenue than a type l. Project size has now been determined for each type. Wages are
adjusted such that (IR
C
) and (RP
l
h
) are strictly binding. Since q
i
h
= q

h
, the constraint (RP
h
h
)
14
The assumption about the relative protability of the high-quality innovation with respect to the low-
quality innovation explains the dierence in the set of renegotiation oers that C is sure to accept for the
cases of major and minor innovations.
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is satised. Since q

hl
is such that V (w; q; l) is tangent to U(w; q; h), the constraint (RP
l
l
) is
satised. And, it is easy to show that, if (RP
l
h
) is strictly binding, then (RP
h
l
) is satised.
Finally, since both utility curves (for the two types) are tangent to the same U(w; q; h) curve
and since type h has lower development costs, we have w
i
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
i
l
 D(q

hl
; l).
Investment
We now determine investment. Dene f = f(w
i
h
; q
i
h
; h)  f(w
i
l
; q
i
l
; l) for f = U; V . C's
marginal benet from a high-quality innovation is
U = P (q

h
; h)  w
i
h
 

P (q
i
l
; l)  w
i
l

:
The binding renegotiation-proof constraint (RP
l
h
) yields w
i
h
  w
i
l
= P (q

h
; h)   P (q
i
l
; h).
Therefore, U = P (q
i
l
; h)   P (q
i
l
; l). Substituting for this in the constraint (IR
C
) and
computing the rst-order condition with respect to investment yields:
p
0
(I
i
)V + 

p
0
(I
i
)U   1

= 0;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (IR
C
). It is easy to show (from the other
rst-order conditions) that  =E

[v
0
(w
i

  D(q
i

; ))jI
i
]. The rst-order condition can be
rewritten as:
p
0
(I
i
)
n
V (w
i
h
; q
i
h
; h) V (w
i
l
; q
i
l
; l)

=E

[v
0
(w
i

 D(q
i

; ))jI
i
]+U(w
i
h
; q
i
h
; h) U(w
i
l
; q
i
l
; l)
o
=1:
Finally, we give an informal description of strategies and beliefs that support this allo-
cation as a PBE of the game. We start with the last stage. In stage 3a and 3b, RU oers
its preferred contract within the set of contracts that C accepts, that is, contracts which
increase C's payo regardless of its beliefs. C rejects all other contracts on the belief that it
was oered by the type on which C would lose if it was accepted. In stage 3, RU selects the
message which yields the highest payo taking into account the possibilities for a successful
renegotiation. In the rst stage, RU proposes the contract characterized above. C accepts
all contracts that yield zero expected prot taking into account the reporting strategy and
its own acceptance decision at the renegotiation stage. Along the path, RU proposes the
characterized contract which C accepts. RU truthfully reveals its type when reporting, and
makes no renegotiation oer. Q.E.D.
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B Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that R
a
(l) 6= R
a
(h). In stage 4, RU would report ^ = argmin

R
a
(). Without
loss of generality, F would therefore accept a contract such that R
a
(l) = R
a
(h). To break
even, it must be that R
a
(l) = R
a
(h) = I
a
. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The subgame starting in stage 3 is a signaling game played between RU and C and is
parameterized by the investment I which is observable to all players. We characterize the
separating equilibrium that maximizes RU's expected utility. This equilibrium is also the
one that would survive the application of the Intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). In
this equilibrium, C earns zero prot on each type, which implies that w
a
(q
a

) = P (q
a

; ) for
all .
Major innovation
Since P (q; h) > P (q; l) for all q > 0, it is type l that may have incentive in mimicking
type h to obtain a higher wage. This implies that there is no distortion in type l's project
size, that is, q
a
l
= q

l
. After substituting for the equilibrium wages, constraint (IC
l
) reduces
to
v(P (q

l
; l)  I
a
 D(q

l
; l))  v(P (q
a
h
; h)  I
a
 D(q
a
h
; l));
which is equivalent to
(q

l
; l)  P (q
a
h
; h) D(q
a
h
; l):
If this is satised at q
a
h
= q

h
, then this is the solution. If not, q
a
h
= q
S
h
where q
S
h
is the
maximal solution to
(q

l
; l) = P (q
a
h
; h) D(q
a
h
; l):
Finally, w
a
h
 D(q
a
h
; h) > w
a
l
 D(q

l
; l) since constraint IC
l
is satised and type h has lower
development costs than type l.
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Minor innovation
Since P (q; h) < P (q; l) for all q > 0, it is type h that may have incentive in mimicking
type l to obtain a higher wage. This implies that there is no distortion in type h's project
size, that is, q
a
h
= q

h
. After substituting for the equilibrium wages, constraint (IC
h
) reduces
to
v(P (q

h
; h)  I
a
 D(q

h
; h))  v(P (q
a
l
; l)  I
a
 D(q
a
l
; h));
which is equivalent to
(q

h
; h)  P (q
a
l
; l) D(q
a
l
; h):
If this is satised at q
a
l
= q

l
, then this is the solution. If not, q
a
l
= q
S
l
where q
S
l
is the minimal
solution to
(q

h
; h) = P (q
a
l
; l) D(q
a
l
; h):
Finally, w
a
h
 D(q

h
; h) > w
a
l
 D(q
a
l
; l) since constraint IC
h
is satised and type l has higher
development costs than type h.
Investment
Investment is determined using rst-order conditions in a similar fashion as in the proof
of Proposition 1. These steps are not reproduced here.
Finally, we give an informal description of strategies and beliefs that support this alloca-
tion as a PBE of the game. We start with the last stage. In the fourth stage, RU reports to
F the type that minimizes its nancial repayment, and implements its preferred project size.
In stage 3, RU proposes the contract characterized above, and C accepts all contracts that
yield zero expected prots on each type. All other contracts are rejected on the belief that
they were oered by type l when the innovation is major and type h when the innovation is
minor. In stage 1, RU oers the nancial contract characterized above and in Lemma 1. All
contracts yielding negative expected prots are rejected by F. These contracts are evaluated
taking into account that RU always pays the lowest repayment specied in the contract.
Q.E.D.
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D Proof of Lemma 2
First, dene f
x
= f(w
x
h
; q
x
h
; h)   f(w
x
l
; q
x
l
; l) for f = U; V and x = i; a. Consider the
optimal allocation under the integrated structure. Using Proposition 1, the output vector is
q
i

= q


for  = l; h. Since U(w; q; l) = U(w; q; h), We know from the proof of Proposition
1 that both allocations must be on the same curve U(w; q; l) (or U(w; q; h)). This implies
that P (q

l
; l)   w
i
l
  I
i
= P (q

h
; h)   w
i
h
  I
i
= 0, where the last equality comes from the
binding participation constraint. Hence, w
i

= P (q


; )   I
i
. RU then earns in state :
v (P (q


; )  I
i
 D(q


; )). Finally, the investment is determined by
p
0
(I
i
)
n
V
i
=E

h
v
0

P (q


; )  I
i
 D(q


; )

jI
i
io
= 1:
In the independent structure, we can use Proposition 2 to show that the output vector is
q
i

= q


for  = l; h. We also know from C's participation constraints that P (q

l
; l) w
a
(q

l
) =
P (q

h
; h) w
a
(q

h
) = 0. Hence, w
a
(q


) = P (q


; ). The nancial payment given in Lemma 1 is
R
a
() = I
a
. RU then earns in state : v (P (q


; )  I
a
 D(q


; )). Finally, the investment
is determined by
p
0
(I
a
) fV
a
=E

[v
0
(P (q


; )  I
a
 D(q


; )) jI
a
]g = 1:
For both structures, RU earns the same expected payo and the same investment is
undertaken. Both structures are therefore equivalent. Q.E.D.
E Proof of Proposition 3
In the integrated structure, the optimal allocation solves the following maximization problem
max
f
I;fw

;q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w
h
; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w
l
; q
l
; l)
subject to : p(I)U(w
h
  I; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))U(w
l
  I; q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
)
V (w
h
; q
h
; h)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; h) s=t U(w; q; l)  U(w
l
; q
l
; l)g (RP
l
h
)
where all nonbinding constraints have been removed, and the participation constraint has
been rewritten by inserting I inside the function U , which is possible because U is linear in
income.
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In the independent structure, the optimal allocation solves the following maximization
problem
max
f
I;fw(q

);q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; l)
subject to : U(w(q
h
); q
h
; h)  0 (IR
C
h
)
U(w(q
l
); q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
l
)
V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; l)  V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; l) (IC
l
)
where the nonbinding incentive constraint has been removed. This problem can be trans-
formed using the following change in variables. Dene w

 w(q

)   I. The maximization
problem then becomes
max
f
I;fw

;q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w
h
; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w
l
; q
l
; l)
subject to : U(w
h
  I; q
h
; h)  0 (IR
C
h
)
U(w
l
  I; q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
l
)
V (w
l
; q
l
; l)  V (w
h
; q
h
; l) (IC
l
)
Suppose rst that the constraint (IC
l
) is not binding in the above problem. The solution then
entails q
a

= q


. This solution satises all constraints in the relaxed problem for the integrated
structure, that is, constraints (IR
C
) and (RP
l
h
). Since both maximization problems have the
same objective function, it has to be the case that the integrated-structure solution yields
a higher payo than the independent-structure one. Now, suppose that constraint (IC
l
) is
binding. The payo for the independent structure is decreased, while that of the integrated
structure is left unchanged. The integrated structure then yields a higher payo in this case
as well. Q.E.D.
F Proof of Proposition 4
In the integrated structure, the optimal allocation solves the following maximization problem
max
f
I;fw

;q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w
h
; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w
l
; q
l
; l)
subject to : p(I)U(w
h
  I; q
h
; h) + (1  p(I))U(w
l
  I; q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
)
V (w
h
; q
h
; h)  max
(w;q)
fV (w; q; h) s=t U(w; q; l)  U(w
l
; q
l
; l)g (RP
l
h
)
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where all nonbinding constraints have been removed, and the participation constraint has
been rewritten by inserting I inside the function U , which is possible because U is linear in
income. For minor innovations, we know from Proposition 1 that q
i
h
= q

h
and q
i
l
= q

hl
. The
constraint (RP
l
h
) is binding, and therefore we have
w
i
l
= P (q

hl
; h)  P (q

h
; h) + w
i
h
:
Substituting for this in the constraint (IR
C
) and solving for w
h
yields
w
i
h
= P (q

h
; h)  I + (1  p(I)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h)) :
The maximization problem then becomes
max
I
p(I)V (w
i
h
; q

h
; h) + (1  p(I))V (w
i
l
; q

hl
; l):
Expanding yields
max
I
p(I)v (P (q

h
; h)  I + (1  p(I)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h)) D(q

h
; h))+
(1  p(I))v (P (q

hl
; h) + (1  p(I)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h))  I  D(q

hl
; l)) :
This can be simplied to
max
I
p(I)v ((q

h
; h) + (1  p(I)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h))  I)+
(1  p(I))v ((q

hl
; l)  p(I) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h))  I) :
In the independent structure, the optimal allocation solves the following maximization
problem
max
f
I;fw(q

);q

g
h
=l
g
p(I)V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; h)) + (1  p(I))V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; l)
subject to : U(w(q
h
); q
h
; h)  0 (IR
C
h
)
U(w(q
l
); q
l
; l)  0 (IR
C
l
)
V (w(q
h
)  I; q
h
; h)  V (w(q
l
)  I; q
l
; h) (IC
h
)
where the nonbinding incentive constraint has been removed. For minor innovations, we know
from Proposition 2 that q
a
h
= q

h
and q
a
l
= q
S
l
. Both participation constraints are binding
which implies that w
a
(q
a

) = P (q
a

; ). Substituting for them in the objective function yields
max
I
p(I)v (P (q

h
; h)  I  D(q

h
; h)) + (1  p(I))v

P (q
S
l
; l)  I  D(q
S
l
; l)

;
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which simplies to
max
I
p(I)v ((q

h
; h)  I) + (1  p(I))v

(q
S
l
; l)  I

:
Dene
x = (q

h
; h)  I
x = (q

h
; h) + (1  p(I)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h))  I
y = (q

hl
; l)  p(I) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h))  I
y = (q
S
l
; l)  I:
Under the assumption of the proposition, we have x < x and y < y. Since v is strictly
concave and increasing, we have for all z < z,
v(z)  v(z) < v
0
(z)(z   z) and v(z)  v(z) > v
0
(z)(z   z):
Hence,
p(I)(v(x)  v(x)) < p(I)v
0
(x)(x  x)
(1  p(I))(v(y)  v(y)) > (1  p(I))v
0
(y)(y   y):
This implies that
(1  p(I))(v(y)  v(y)) + p(I)v
0
(x)(x  x) > p(I)(v(x)  v(x)) + (1  p(I))v
0
(y)(y   y):
Rearranging terms yields
fp(I)v(x) + (1  p(I))v(y)g >
n
p(I)v(x) + (1  p(I))v(y)
o
+ (1  p(I))v
0
(y)(y   y)  p(I)v
0
(x)(x  x):
The left-hand-side term is the objective function for the independent structure. The rst
term of the right-hand side is the objective function for the integrated structure. The second
term simplies to
(1  p(I))
n
p(I) (v
0
(y)  v
0
(x)) (P (q

hl
; l)  P (q

hl
; h)) + v
0
(y)

(q
S
l
; l)  (q

hl
; l)
o
> 0:
We know that y < x. Concavity of v implies that v
0
(y) > v
0
(x). For minor innovations,
P (q

hl
; l) > P (q

hl
; h). This establishes that the rst term in the expression is positive. Under
30
the assumption of the proposition, the second term is positive. The whole expression is
therefore positive.
This implies that the objective function of the independent structure is larger than the
objective function of the integrated structure for all I. The independent structure then yields
a higher payo to RU than does the integrated structure. Q.E.D.
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